This paper analyzes how access to imported inputs affects firms in developing countries, where domestically produced high-quality inputs are relatively costly. We build an O-Ring type model with quality complementarity across inputs, ranking inputs by their quality-sensitivity. Because high-quality inputs are relatively cheap in international markets, firms use these instead of domestic inputs for quality-sensitive production steps. This substitution effect lowers the demand for domestic input quality (such as skilled labor), while it raises output quality. At the same time, a complementarity effect increases the return to quality in the remaining inputs. This raises output quality further; it also increases the demand for domestic input quality (skills), counterbalancing the first effect. To provide evidence for this mechanism, we match high-resolution data from Chilean customs to a large firm-level panel for the period 1992-2005. In line with the model's predictions, importing Chilean firms produce higher-quality output. In addition, importers use ceteris paribus a lower share of skilled workers, while their skill demand increases significantly with the quality of imports.
Introduction
Trade has important effects on the allocation of productive resources across firms. A large literature following Melitz (2003) has shown that more productive firms profit relatively more from export opportunities. More recently, several contributions have examined the role of imports: Access to inputs from international markets can have substantial effects on firm performance in developing countries. By lowering the cost of imported inputs, trade liberalization raises firm productivity (Amiti and Konings, 2007) , fosters the introduction of new products (Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova, 2010) , and increases profits (De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik, 2012) . This paper explores the role of input quality in this process. We assume that rich countries have a cost advantage at producing high-quality products, so that trade liberalization lowers the effective cost of high-quality inputs in the developing world. For each firm, our model features a continuum of inputs that differ with respect to their quality intensity. In addition, output quality is determined by a complementarity of individual inputs in the spirit of Kremer's (1993) O-Ring theory. This combination leads to a number of novel predictions that we subsequently test using a detailed Chilean firm panel.
We use the model to analyze how access to imported inputs affects firms in less developed countries. We examine two opposing effects: A substitution effect that reduces the demand for high-quality inputs in developing countries because they are replaced by imports; and a complementarity effects that raises the return to quality in firms that purchase high-quality inputs abroad. Both effects are embedded in our model that builds on Kremer's (1993) O-Ring production function. Firms combine a continuum of production tasks (or inputs) to produce their final producta differentiated variety with endogenous quality. The quality of the various input tasks is complimentary, and tasks are ranked by their sensitivity with respect to quality. Tasks can either be performed by workers or purchased in the form of inputs. The higher the skill level of workers, the higher their quality of task performance. Thus, task-specific skill levels within firms increase along the quality-sensitivity ranking of tasks. In the presence of prohibitively high import tariffs, all tasks are performed by domestic labor. When tariffs fall, firms in a skill-scarce developing country substitute highly skilled workers with high-quality imported inputs. At the same time, the return to quality in the remaining tasks increases, due to quality complementarity with the imported input. The net impact of falling import tariffs on skill demand depends on the relative strength of the skill substitution and complementarity effect.
To test the model's predictions and gauge magnitudes, we use a comprehensive database of Chilean firms over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . This includes information on firm productivity, prices, and the type of workers employed. We pair the firm panel with information on imports from Chilean customs, covering the firm-specific imports at the detailed HS-8 level. To measure import quality at the firm level, we construct two proxies. First, an index based on the price of each firm's imports, relative to the average price paid by all other firms for the same import. This reflects the assumption that prices indicate product quality, following Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) . Second, the proportion of white-collar workers that is employed in producing the corresponding product in U.S. manufacturing. This assumes that high-quality goods are produced by skilled workers (c.f. Verhoogen, 2008) and that U.S. manufacturing is representative of the world technology used to produce Chilean imports.
1 Both input quality measures yield similar results. We begin by analyzing the cross-sectional dimension of the panel, motivated by the fact selection across firms is typically identified as the most important driver in the empirical trade literature (c.f. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Pavcnik, 2003) . We compare firms within narrowly defined output sectors in each year. In line with the skill substitution effect, importing Chilean firms are less skill intensive than their peers. We also find strong support for the complementarity effect: Firms with higher import quality employ a significantly larger share of skilled workers.
Our results suggest that the skill substitution effect lowers the proportion of skilled workers by 5-10 percentage points, while the complementarity effect raises skill demand by 2-6 percentage points. On average, firms that import inputs use about 2 percentage points fewer skilled workers, suggesting that the skill substitution effect dominates in Chilean manufacturing. At the same time, the complementarity effect is quantitatively important. The fact that it is not included in standard trade models can explain part of the discrepancy between theory and evidence regarding skill demand. Our paper is related to a growing literature that analyzes the effects of international trade on skill demand and income inequality. The complementarity effect in our model can help to resolve a well-documented puzzle: While standard trade theory predicts that trade liberalization is biased towards unskilled labor in developing countries, the opposite pattern prevails in the data (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) . In balance, the evidence shows a substantial increase in countries' exposure to international trade and an increase in inequality during the last decades. During the 1980s and 1990s the majority of developing countries experienced increases in the skill premium, and this pattern is often accompanied by trade reforms. For example, the skill premium in Mexico increased by 68% between the mid-eighties and mid-nineties (Cragg and Epelbaum, 1996) , by 20% in Argentina during its trade integration experience in the nineties (Gasparini, 2003) , and by 13% in India between 1987 and 1999 (Kijama, 2006 . Existing models of these effects typically feature symmetry across imported inputs, and product quality is equivalent or closely related to effect).
We use data on Chilean firms and Customs for our empirical analysis. The Chilean firm panel was previously used, among others, by Pavcnik (2002) and Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) . 3 Chile has liberalized its trade gradually over time, and import tariffs decreased again substantially between 1995 and 2005 -the period that we analyze. Data availability imposes an important limitation on our analysis: we do not observe worker-specific tasks within firms and thus have to use the share of skilled workers as a proxy. That is, we analyze skilled labor shares at the firm level, rather than tasks within firms. On balance, our result suggest that firms in a relatively skill scarce country such as Chile import skill-intensive, high-quality inputs, and that these substitute for skilled labor. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline a simple model that illustrates the main mechanism. Section 3 presents our data, and Section 4 the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Model
Our model features a continuum of firms that produce differentiated final goods of various quality levels. Production within each firm involves a continuum of inputs i ∈ [0, 1] with different sensitivity to quality, and quality is complementary across inputs. Firms purchase inputs in the form of hired labor, or as physical inputs, such as equipment or intermediates. One interpretation of this setup is that inputs reflect tasks in production. These can be performed by hired workers within the firm. Alternatively, a task can be performed outside the firm and purchased in the form of intermediate inputs, or it can be performed by capital equipment that is also purchased outside the firm. 4 To simplify the exposition, we characterize individual inputs i exclusively by their quality level q i . Later, when deriving predictions of the model, we assume that the skill level of labor determines the quality with which a task is performed, so that q i also reflects worker skills.
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Our analysis uses a partial equilibrium setting. We focus on input quality and take the demand (as a function of output quality) as given. Thus, export decisions are not explicitly modeled. In addition, we assume that the manufacturing sector is small relative to the economy, so that the cost of input quality (or the wage profile, to the extent that input quality reflects worker skills) is 3 Pavcnik finds that trade liberalization in the 1970s and 80s increased plant productivity and that much of this effect was driven by reallocating resources to more productive producers, as in the framework by Melitz (2003) . Kasahara and Rodrigue show that productivity increases can also be attributed to Chilean plants becoming importers of intermediate inputs. 4 It is not essential for our argument whether imported inputs reflect intermediates or capital equipment. 5 By the same argument, the quality of intermediate inputs or capital equipment will be determined by the skill level of workers that produced them. We use this to construct a proxy for input quality in the section 3.
given. Each firm produces a variety ω. The sensitivity of output quality to the quality of each input is the same across firms. However, firms differ with respect to two parameters that they draw from random distributions: The quality of the raw material that they use, m ω , and their (qualityspecific) productivity, A ω . A draw of a firm is thus a set of production instructions (which may be thought of as a patent) on how to transform a basic input of a given quality into a final product. For example, the production of some varieties of watches is based on precious metal, combined with instructions for high-precision manual work, while other watches use cheap plastic inputs together with standardized low-skilled manufacturing. The quality of the final product is endogenous and depends on both A ω and m ω .
We initially consider an economy that has no access to imported inputs. The cost-of-quality profile starts off low and then increases rapidly with rising quality levels. This reflects the conditions in developing countries, where high-quality inputs are relatively expensive. 6 We derive the optimal quality of each input, q iω , used by a firm producing variety ω, as well as the quality of the final good, Q ω . We assume for simplicity that there is no separate sector producing domestic inputs. Thus, when imported inputs are not available, firms perform all tasks by hiring domestic workers. Since all inputs have to be purchased domestically, the cost of input quality is equivalent to the wage profile. When input tariffs fall, high-quality inputs become available at a price that is below the domestic cost of high-skilled workers performing the same task. We show that firms producing higher quality output will tend to adopt high-quality international inputs. This has a two-fold effect on skill demand in these firms: On the one hand, the average skill level drops, because the most qualified workers that used to perform the high-quality tasks within a firm are replaced by imported inputs. On the other hand, the skill level of the remaining tasks increases because of the complementarity with the higher quality of the new imported inputs. The former effect reflects a Heckscher-Ohlin type specialization of firms in a skill-scarce country on less skill intensive production tasks. The second effect represents a counteracting force based on input quality complementarity, which dampens (and possibly reverses) the impact of trade on relative skill demand in a skill scarce country.
Consumption
Consumers of manufacturing products derive utility from quality-adjusted varieties, as given by the CES function:
where Q ω represents the quality of variety ω, and x ω is the corresponding quantity consumed. Ω is the set of varieties that are produced, and σ corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between (quality-adjusted) varieties. We assume that varieties are substitutes such that σ > 1. Following Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) , we interpret the quality of a variety as any product attribute valued by the consumers, and adopt the notation X to represent the quality-adjusted consumption aggregate (reflecting market size). Consumers minimize the cost of consumption, ∫ ω∈Ω p ω x ω dω, subject to U (·) ≥ X. This yields the demand for varieties ω:
where
is the aggregate price index corresponding to X. Since we focus on partial equilibrium, we take both P and X as given. 7 Crucially, following (2), demand increases in the quality of a variety.
Production
Firms optimize with respect to both quality and quantity of output. We begin with the former, and use q iω to denote the quality of individual inputs i ∈ [0, 1], used by the firm that produces variety ω. Each input i reflects one specific task that needs to be performed in production. This can either be done by hiring workers or by purchasing inputs in the form of intermediates or capital equipment that performs these tasks. Differentiating between these possibilities is not crucial for our qualitative results. The quality of variety ω is given by:
where A ω is a productivity parameter, and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the quality of the different inputs. The smaller ρ, the stronger is the degree of quality complementarity. In the 7 We do not make an explicit assumption about trade in final products. If trade liberalization affects P and X, this will change the number of firms in general equilibrium, but will not affect any of our cross-sectional results. extreme, with ρ = 0, having a single input with low quality will decrease the overall quality Q ω proportionately, even if all other inputs are of high quality. With ρ > 0, higher quality of some inputs i can partially compensate lower quality of others. We assume 0 < ρ < 1 to represent complementarity between the quality of inputs in the spirit of Kremer (1993) . The parameter α i reflects the sensitivity of output quality Q ω with respect to the quality of input i. We rank inputs by their quality sensitivity, beginning with the lowest α i . In the following, we use simplest formulation that delivers such a ranking, α i = i.
In order to produce one unit of variety ω at quality Q ω , firms face two cost components. First, one unit of each input i is purchased at cost c(q iω ). Second, one unit of raw material of value m ω is needed to produce one unit of variety ω.
8 Together with A ω , m ω determines the quality of output and other variables related to firm performance such as sales and profits. Both are drawn randomly, as explained in detail below. The quality-dependent unit cost function is given by:
The cost of task or input quality has a quadratic form. This is an analytically convenient way to represent a convex quality-cost profile. The cost of one unit of input i in the production of variety ω is given by:
where a c corresponds to the cost of performing the task at zero quality, and b c indicates how steeply costs rise in quality. The subscript c represents the country where the input is purchased -home (H) vs. foreign countries (F ). We assume that the home country is a developing country with relatively cheap low-quality inputs (e.g., unskilled labor), so that a H is low. However, the home country faces a relatively steep slope parameter b H . The opposite is true for imported inputs, whose costs are higher for low-quality inputs but reflect a flatter profile. Therefore, a H < a F and b H > b F . Figure 1 shows the two input/task cost functions for H and F , which intersect at pointq.
For q iω ≤q, it is optimal to purchase input i domestically, e.g., by hiring local workers to perform task i. Otherwise, for q iω >q, the producer of variety ω will import variety i. Falling import tariffs shift the import cost function downward, so thatq decreases. We will see that this favors producers of high-quality output who import their most quality-sensitive inputs. Note that the relevant cost function for firm optimization is the lower envelope of c H and c F .
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In addition to the cost components in (4), firms have to pay a quality-independent fixed cost of production f each period, independent of the quality produced. Total costs are thus given by x ω C(Q ω ) + f . Consequently, profits of a firm producing variety ω are given by
Substituting for x ω from (2) yields:
Optimization
When firms import some of their inputs, the integral in (4) can be split into two parts. All inputs below the cutoffι ω (i.e., those with low quality-sensitivity α i = i) are purchased domestically, while those with i >ι ω are purchased abroad. This implies:
Both the set of input-specific quality {q iω } and the cutoffι ω are chosen optimally by each firm. We derive the optimal choice of these variables, as well as quality and quantity of output, in four steps. First, we analyze the cost-minimizing choice of input quality q iω for a given qualityQ ω . This yields the cost of quality production, C(·) as a function of output qualityQ ω . In the second step, we derive the profit-maximizing price from (6) as a markup over the cost per unit of a given quality, C(Q ω ). Third, we obtain the optimal choice of quality, Q * ω . The profit-maximizing quality ensures that the average quality-specific cost AC(Q ω ) is at its minimum, so that Q * ω is obtained from the simple relationship M C(Q * ω ) = C(Q * ω ). Simultaneously, we obtain the optimal cutoff ι * ω . Finally, we derive the quantity of production of each variety as well as firm profits.
Step 1: Optimal choice of input quality We begin by deriving the optimal choice of the quality with which each input i is performed, q iω , in order to produce variety ω at a given qualityQ ω . For now, we take the cutoffι ω as given and solve the expenditure minimization problem
In Appendix A.1, we show that the optimal choice of q iω implies that the cost of quality -as a function of output quality Q ω -is given by:
Thus, more imported inputs (i.e., a lower cutoffι ω ) raises C f,ω . The integral I(ι ω ) is defined as
Using Leibniz' rule and b H > b F , it is straightforward to show that I ′ (ι ω ) > 0. Thus, the integral decreases when more inputs are imported; a larger proportion of imports puts a higher weight on inputs with the flatter foreign cost function.
Step 2: Pricing and profits Next, we derive the profit-maximizing price of variety ω. We begin by deriving (6) with respect to p ω , still taking Q ω as given. Note that this corresponds to profit maximization with respect to quantity of output, which yields the standard result that the price is a constant markup over (quantity-specific) marginal cost:
For given price and quality-dependent cost, a variety producer's profits from (6) are then given by:
Step 3: Optimal output quality We can now derive the optimal quality of variety ω. Individual producers maximize (10) with respect to
is the average quality-specific cost of variety ω. In other words, AC(·) represents the average cost of each unit of quality of variety ω. Our assumption that varieties ω are substitutes implies that 1 − σ < 0. Thus, maximizing (10) amounts to minimizing AC(·). For a givenι ω , average cost is therefore minimized at the quality
, where average and marginal cost of output quality intersect. In Appendix A.2 we show this derivation in more detail, together with the equation that determines the optimal cutoff levelι * ω . The optimal choice of output quality must thus satisfy: Figure 2 illustrates the solution for the optimal quality Q * ω , by plotting the average quality-specific cost together with the marginal cost. The intersection determines Q * ω , for givenι ω . Note that in the absence of trade, Q * ω is higher in the more skill abundant foreign country. This is driven by two effects: First, a F > a H increases C f,ω for the foreign country, shifting the AC curve up. Second, b F is lower, which tilts the M C curve to the right. Both effects imply higher Q * F ω , and the model thus predicts -in the spirit of Heckscher-Ohlin -that high-quality varieties are produced in skill-abundant countries.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
To solve for the optimal quality analytically, we derive (7) with respect to Q ω and use the result in (11). This yields
Higher quality-productivity A ω spells higher variety quality, while a steeper marginal cost of input quality (higher b H or b F ) implies lower Q * ω . This is intuitive. Another relationship, however, needs closer examination: Higher C f,ω implies higher quality. For example, a higher cost of the raw material, m ω , implies that the variety will be produced at a higher quality. This is because with a higher fixed component of quality-specific cost, firms have to choose higher quality overall in order to minimize the average cost of quality. Intuitively, firms optimally use expensive raw materials in combination with high-quality inputs.
Finally, we derive the optimal quality used of each individual input (see Appendix A.1 for details):
, and b iω = b F otherwise. This equation identifies the determinants of input quality. First, higher C f,ω (e.g., raw material cost m ω ) leads to higher input qualityanalogous to the effect on output quality. Second, lower marginal cost of quality for input i, b iω , is associated with higher quality of the corresponding input i. Similarly, a drop in the marginal cost of input quality in general (reflected by smaller I(ι * ω ), e.g., due to lower b H or b F ) leads to higher q * iω for all inputs i. Finally, the larger α i , the higher is the optimal quality of the corresponding input i.
10
At the cutoff point i ≤ι * ω , input purchases switch from the domestic to the foreign market. The corresponding drop from b iω = b H to b F implies that input quality jumps upward at this point. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , which also shows that access to imported inputs raises the quality of both newly imported inputs (i >ι * ω ), but also for those that are still purchased domestically (i ≤ι * ω ). The latter is a result of the complementarity effect which we discuss in more detail below. The results for optimal input and output quality lead to the following proposition: Proposition 1. Firms that import relatively more inputs produce higher-quality output and use higher-quality inputs for any given input skill sensitivity α i . Thus, importing firms c.p. produce higher quality output and purchase higher-quality inputs.
, the first result follows directly from (12), and the second from (13). The second part of the proposition follows trivially because for non-importers, ι ω = 1, whileι ω < 1 for importers.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Note that the positive association between import status and input/output quality in 1 works via the access to high-quality imported inputs from international markets, in combination with the input quality complementarity in our model. The optimal quality of imported inputs is higher due to the lower marginal cost of quality in the international market. This is illustrated by the region i >ι ω in Figure 4 . In addition, due to the complementarity effect, domestic input quality is also higher (in the region i ≤ι ω ).
Step 4: Profits and output quantity Finally, we derive profits and the quantity of firms' output. Substituting (12) in (7), we obtain the unit cost of output at the optimal quality level:
Firm revenue follows from (2) and is given by:
10 Note, however, that an increase in the quality sensitivity of all inputs (i.e., increasing all α i by the same factor) will not affect q * iω . To see this, multiply all α i in (8) and (13) by a constant.
For given price and quality-dependent cost, a variety producer's profits from (6) are given by:
To interpret these equations, the following relationship, which follows from (12) and (14), is useful:
where AC(Q * ω ,ι * ω ) is constant for a given variety ω, as long as the input cost profiles do not change. Thus, for a given external environment, firm profits are constant for a given draw of A ω and m ω .
Falling input tariffs expand the possibilities of firms to optimally choose their input quality from domestic and foreign inputs. Thus, their quality-specific cost must decrease. This is illustrated in Figure 3 . When using the optimal cutoff pointι * ω to split between domestic and foreign inputs, the average quality cost curve is always below or identical to AC H and AC F .
11 Consequently, profits are either unchanged or augment if the cost of foreign inputs falls, depending on the quality of output. High-quality producers will profit relatively more than producers of lowquality varieties. This discussion leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Total sales and profits are relatively larger for firms that import (some of) their inputs, as compared to non-importers.

PROOF. TBD [Insert Figure 3 here]
The above solutions for firms' optimal choices, imply the following proposition, which illustrates a convenient feature of our model:
Proposition 3. Input quality and output price depends only on a firm's draw of m ω , but not on
On the other hand, output quality, sales, and profits depend on both m ω and A ω .
PROOF. We show in Appendix A.2 that the optimal cutoff point for domestically purchased vs. imported inputs,ι * ω , depends only on the input-quality cost functions c H (q) and c H (q), and on the firm's draw of raw material quality, m ω . In particular,ι * ω does not depend on A ω . Then, (13) and (14)- (17) yield the results.
Average Quality of Inputs, Skilled Labor Share, and Wages
In the following we show how our model can be applied to analyze the firm-level relationship between imported inputs and skill demand. We have already derived the prediction that importing firms use higher quality of individual inputs (see Proposition 1). When taking the model to the data, we face two important restrictions: First, inputs are not only purchased outside the firm, but are also performed by workers within firms. Thus, firms will typically purchase a mix of labor inputs and physical inputs produced by other firms in the domestic market. Imported inputs, on the other hand, only have the physical dimension. To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we refer to all domestically purchased inputs as labor tasks/inputs in the following. When taking the model to the data, we will again differentiate between labor and physical domestic inputs. The predictions regarding input quality are the same for both. Second, we do not observe individual tasks performed by workers in production (which would correspond to i ω in our model). What we do observe is the division into white-collar workers (including, for example, "specialized workers in the productive process") and blue-collar workers (including among others "personal services and security workers"). We thus assume that higher-ranked (i.e., more quality-sensitive) inputs in our model are performed by white-collar workers, while low-ranked inputs are performed by bluecollar workers. We define the cutoff level i BW such that all inputs i ∈ [0, i BW ) use blue-collar labor, and the remainder i ∈ (i BW , 1] are performed by skilled white-collar workers. While this is clearly a strong assumption, all results that it implies will go through as long as on average, white-collar workers perform more complex (quality-sensitive) tasks. Our previous assumption maps the individual inputs (or tasks) in our model to the two types of workers that we observe. The missing dimension is the quality of tasks performed by workers. Following the large literature in the spirit of Mincer (1974) , we use wages as a proxy for worker 'quality'. 12 This is also in line with Kremer (1993) , who assumes that the quality of an input-task is equivalent to the skill level of the worker performing it. Since we do not observe individual worker-task-wage pairs, we need to derive a measure for the average (task) quality specific to blue-and white-collar workers. We begin by deriving a measure for the average quality of all inputs performed by domestic labor in the production of variety ω:
where we used (13) and our assumption α i = i to derive the second equality, and define ξ = (ρ+1)/(2ρ+1). Note that we implicitly assume that when firms use workers to perform input tasks, the production of each unit of input i requires one unit of labor. 13 The expression in parentheses in (18) illustrates the substitution effect: As more inputs are imported,ι * ω declines. Thus, the average skill level (or quality) of employed workers falls. However, the square root in the equation will increase, because C ′ f,ω (ι ω ) < 0 and I ′ (ι ω ) > 0. This is responsible for the complementarity effect.
Our discussion leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. The average skill level of workers employed by variety producer ω decreases in the proportion of imported inputs (substitution effect), and it increases in the quality of these imports (complementarity effect).
PROOF. For the first part, see the argument in the previous paragraph. For the second part of the proof, we want to isolate the effect of imported input quality, i.e., keep the proportion of inputs (given by the cutoff pointι * ω ) constant. The parameter that varies is the draw of primary input quality, m ω , which in turn determines input and output quality. Note from (8) that for a givenι *
will be larger for firms with a higher draw of m ω . According to (13), these firms will also use higher quality of all inputs; in particular, their inputs will be of higher quality for any given quality sensitivity level α i = i. Finally, (18) implies that these firms will also have a higher average quality of domestic inputs, since their C f,ω (ι ω ) is larger.
We now perform the final step to map the model to the data -define the average quality of tasks performed by blue-collar and white-collar workers, respectively. Provided that importing firms use a positive mass of white-collar workers (ι * ω > i BW ), this yields:
Following these equations, and under our assumption that wages reflect worker quality, Proposition 4 leads to the following corollary:
13 Including a separate sector that produces intermediates domestically would not change our results, as long as there is some potential for imported inputs to substitute for domestic labor. If, on the other hand, imported inputs exclusively substitute for domestic inputs, the substitution effect would be shut down, and the complementarity effect would lead to rising skill demand as a consequence of falling import tariffs.
14 Otherwise, ifι * (complementarity effect) . If the complementarity effect is strong, a higher import share will also be associated with higher white-collar wages.
Model Predictions for a Cross-Section of Firms
Before turning to the empirical part, we summarize the predictions of our model for a cross-section of firms:
1. Firms that produce higher-quality output Q ω also use higher quality inputs q iω . This follows from (13).
2. Importing firms produce higher-quality output and use higher-quality domestic inputs (Proposition 1)
3. Firms that produce higher quality are larger in terms of revenue and make higher profits. These predictions follow from (15) and (16), respectively.
4. For a given input quality, importing firms employ workers with lower average skill levels, but the worker skills increases in the quality of inputs (Proposition 4).
We provide empirical support for these predictions in the next section.
Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
We use firm-level data of imports and tariffs from Chilean Customs, combined with plant-level data on industrial sectors from ENIA (Encuesta Nacional de Industria Anual). This dataset is a census of Chilean plants with more than 10 employees, which is collected by INE (the Chilean national statistical agency). The majority of firms in Chile run only one plant. About 4% percent of firms run several plants. In such cases of multiple-plant firms, we aggregate all plants to the firm-level before matching the data with the Customs information. ENIA also provides the corresponding four-digit ISIC category for each plant. We use the following variables from ENIA: White-collar workers, blue-collar workers, total employment, amount of exports in a given year, the level of sales, value added, raw materials, intermediate goods used in production, the region where the plant is located and the capital stock. The white-collar category includes specialized workers involved in the production process, as well as administrative and executive employees. Blue-collar workers comprise less-qualified employees working directly or indirectly in the production process and those working in the service area.
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Data reliability is a common concern for plant-level survey data from developing countries. We drop plant-level observations when there are signs of unreliable reporting. In particular, we exclude plants that have missing or zero values for total employment, demand for electricity, investment, demand of raw materials, sales, operational income and value added. We also drop observations where a huge variation is observed in total employment, value added and sales. This procedure leaves 68,383 firm-year observations for the period between 1992 and 2005. The year with the highest number of observations is 2004 with 5.153 and the lowest number is 4.506 in 2001.
Data on imports and tariffs come from Chilean Customs and are disaggregated at eight digits of the Harmonized System (HS). These data allow us to identify the CIF value of an import of good j, purchased by firm i in year t, as well as the tariff associated with that import. In order to keep the sample tractable, we aggregate the HS-8 customs data to the commonly used HS-6 detail. We obtain more than 1.1 million firm-level observations with non-zero imports for approximately 3,800 firms at annual frequency between 1992 and 2005.
Our data covers the period from 1992 to 2005 -a period during which the Chilean economy experienced a marked trade integration with the rest of the world. Over this period, import tariffs were significantly reduced, falling from more than 10 percent in 1992 to less than 3 percent in 2005. Tariff dispersion across firms also changed remarkably throughout our sample period. Figure 6 shows that tariffs in 1992 were concentrated at the top level of 11 percent. In 2005, on the other hand, the distribution overall is smoother, with a larger concentration at minimum tariff levels, and a ceiling at 6 percent. We exploit this variation below.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Main variables
From the various categories of workers, we include "specialized workers in the productive process" as well as supervisors and executives in our baseline measure of skilled workers. Dividing these by the total number of employees, we obtain the share of skilled workers, h it . Note that this variable does not include administrative staff. We also define a broader measure to check the robustness of our results. The variable h w it reflect the share of white-collar workers. It additionally includes administrative staff as well as "employees hired for a commission". The remaining (blue-collar) category comprises "non-qualified workers directly involved in production", "non-qualified workers indirectly involved in production," and "personal services and security workers". We use the same division to calculate white-collar and blue-collar wages wage W and wage B , respectively. 
Proxies for import quality
We use two proxies for the quality of imported inputs. The first index is based on import prices, while the second uses the skill intensity with which each import category is produced in the US.
The import price index
To construct our first index for input quality, we follow Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) , using prices within given product categories as an indicator for product quality. We build on this approach and extend it to the case where a firm imports several the same good in different units of measurement. Let V ikj denote the value that firm i imports of product k (at the HS-8 detail), where j gives the units in which k is measured. For example, k='chemicals' may be measured in kilograms or cans. Q ikj denotes the corresponding quantity, measured in the specified unit j. We define P ikj = V ikj /Q ikj as the price per unit.
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In a first step, we calculate the weighted average price of imports in HS-8 category k that are measured in unit j:
whereQ kj = ∑ I i=1 Q ikj is the total quantity imported of HS-8 product k, measured in unit j, by all firms in our sample.P kj is an indicator for the average quality of HS-8 product k (measured in unit j). Next, we derive a quality measure for the case when a firm imports the same HS-8 product measured in several different units j. For example, a firm may import $400 worth of chemicals measured in kilograms and $800 in cans. Even if this is the exact same chemical, the two observations cannot be joined as long as we do not know how many kilograms there are in a can -and this is the case in our dataset. Nevertheless, we know how much other firms in the sample pay on average for the same category of chemicals, measured in kg and cans. Based on this information, we calculate the following index:
16 Wage data and not available consistently for the finer categories corresponding to h it . 17 More precisely, we use unit values. To simplify notation, we refer to these as prices.
whereV ik = ∑ J j=1 V ikj is the total value of firm i's imports of product category k (comprising all units j). θ ik is thus an index for the quality (as proxied by prices) of import(s) k used by firm i, relative to the quality of k used by all other firms in the sample.
18 Using (21), we can derive a similar index for all imported inputs of firm i:
whereV i = ∑ K k=1V ik is the total value of firm i's imports. We refer to θ i as the input quality index of firm i. If prices within narrow product categories reflect product quality, we will obtain θ i < 1 if i's imported inputs are on average below the quality of the same inputs purchased by other firms.
If i's inputs are above average quality, θ i > 1.
Relative quality of imported vs. domestic inputs
Our argument relies on the assumption that imported inputs are of higher quality than domestic ones. In the following, we use data from ENIA to provide supporting evidence. For the period 1996-2000, ENIA reports, for each firm i and year t, the value V ikt and quantity Q ikt of domestic and imported inputs by detailed product categories k. The latter follow an ENIA-specific classification that is broadly comparable to the HS-8 product code. Units are product-specific (e.g., kg, thousands, or liters). We use these data to derive two price-based quality indexes of imported vs. domestically purchased inputs for each input type k in year t. The first index uses within-firm and within-product variation of input prices:
The weighted average of this measure (using total input value
as weights) is 0.19, implying that within firms, imported products are about 20% more expensive than the domestic inputs of the same product category. The measure θ rel ikt uses only observations for which a firm purchases the same input both domestically and internationally. This drops more than 80% of the approximately 147,000 firm-product-year observations, discarding input quality-variation across 18 To illustrate θ ik , suppose that a firm imports 10kg of chemicals worth $400 and 80 cans worth $800 of the same HS-8 chemical. ThenV ik = 1, 200, P ik1 = 40, and P ik2 = 10. In addition, suppose that the average prices in the sample areP k1 = 8 andP k2 = 30 (where the former is measured in $ per kg, and the latter in $ per can). Consequently, θ ik = That is, the price of chemicals in HS-8 category k purchased by firm i is, on average, 31% higher than the price that other companies pay for chemicals in the same HS-8 category. We would interpret this number as indicating relatively high quality of chemical category k purchased by i. Note that because of the logarithm used in (21), exp(θ ik ) represents the weighted geometric mean of P ikj /P kj . firms. For example, suppose that a vehicle manufacturer imports high-quality steel from abroad, while a building materials supplier purchases lower-grade steel domestically. Neither of these will influence θ rel ikt . To exploit this additional between-firm variation of input quality, we construct the alternative measure θ rel kt .
whereP dom kt is the average price of product k purchased domestically by all firms, andP imp kt is the equivalent measure for imported units of good k. Figure 7 shows the distribution of θ rel kt ; the measure has a mean of 1.54, indicating that imported inputs are about exp(1.54) = 4.6 times as expensive as domestic ones, when taking into account variation across importers and non-importers. This number is slightly smaller when using the median (1.24) instead, which implies a premium of 3.4.
[Insert Figure 7 here] Import skill intensity Our second proxy for the quality of imported inputs is import skill intensity, σ it , which measures the relative importance of skilled labor used in the production of firm i's imported inputs. We combine data on imported inputs of Chilean firms with the skill intensity of producing those inputs in the United States. That is, we rely on the common assumption that the U.S. reflects the technological frontier. We define imported input skill intensity as follows:
where N = 4, 791 is number of imported good categories (HS-6) in our sample, and h w jt is the white-collar wage bill share in the production of product j in the U.S. in year t. The latter is available at annual frequency from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Database at the 4-digit SIC level. To combine it with our firm-level data, we match the 450 4-digit SIC sectors to 6-digit HS products from customs data.
19 Whenever more than one SIC sector falls into the corresponding HS-6 category, we use the average across the 4-digit SIC sectors. Finally, s ijt is the share of input j in overall imports by firm i in year t:
Empirical Results
In this section, we provide empirical evidence that is in line with the predictions of our model. Most empirical results are identified using the variation across firms within narrowly defined sectors. Thus, our main results are driven by firm selection along the quality dimension. This follows our model, where draw of primary material quality (m ω ) determines differences in quality of inputs, outputs, and importing behavior across firms. Our empirical approach is also in line with a large literature that examines differences across trading and non-trading firms (for a recent overview see Melitz and Redding, 2012) . In section 4.4 we also examine the within-firm dimension. There is not enough variation within firms to obtain significant effects on a year-to-year basis. Nevertheless, we find that both the substitution and the complementarity effect become stronger with the time that a firm has been an importer of inputs. This finding would be represented in our model if we introduced adjustment costs or labor market frictions, so that firms do not converge immediately to the new optimal production pattern after beginning to import, or after switching to higher-quality imports.
Previous and Novel Stylized Facts
Before turning to our empirical results, we check whether our data replicate previously established stylized facts. The first two columns of Table 1 show that exporting firms within 3-digit sectors are larger both in terms of employment and sales. The same is true for firms that import inputs. Importers and exporters are also relatively more productive (column 3). Next, columns 4 and 5 establish a novel fact: Chilean importing firms use c.p. a lower share of white-collar workers than their non-importing peers. This is in line with the substitution effect in our model. At the same time, firms that import higher-quality inputs (as measured by our price-based proxy) employ a relatively high share of skilled workers. This provides support for the skill complementarity mechanism in our model. The latter also receives support from the results in column 6, which shows that wages are larger for importing firms. Together, columns 5 and 6 is in line with our model's prediction that importing firms specialize in lower-quality tasks (performing relatively fewer white-collar tasks), but perform the remaining in-house tasks at a high quality level (as indicated by higher wages). In the following, we investigate the model predictions in more detail.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Imported Inputs, Output Prices, and Domestic Input Prices
We begin by analyzing the relationship between firm's imported inputs and output quality, measured by output prices. Our model predicts that importing firms produce higher-quality output. We measure products at the highly detailed 8-digit level and estimate the regression (following Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012) :
Where P out ikjt is the price at which firm i sells product k, measured in unit j, in year t. 20 We include our price-based indicator for the quality of imported inputs, θ varies at this level. We include several fixed effects: α st are sector-year effects (where sectors are measured at the 3-digit level); α kjt are product-unit-year effects, and α r are region dummies. In addition, X ijt represents a vector of control variables.
The results of this estimation are reported in panel A of Table 2 . The first column replicates the finding in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) that larger plants charge more for their output. Columns 2 and 3 show that the same is true for exporters and firms that import inputs. Column 4 focuses attention on importing firms only and shows that there is a strong positive relationship between our import price index and output prices. This suggests that higher quality of imports is associated with higher output quality, which is in line with the complementarity mechanism in our model. In column 5 we include export and import dummies together with the import quality index. While all remain significant, the import dummy reduces to about half the magnitude measured in column 3. This is in line with our model mechanism where the import status-quality relationship works through input quality, so that it is best captured by the coefficient on θ imp it . The results in column 6 further support this interpretation: the importer dummy d imp it becomes insignificant once we include additional controls in column 6, while the coefficient on θ imp it remains highly significant and positive.
[Insert Table 2 here] Next, we turn to the relationship between the quality of inputs and firm-level imports. We use the price of domestically purchased inputs, ln(P inp ikjt ), as dependent variable and estimate the equation
The results are reported in panel B of Table 2 ; they mirror the findings for output prices. Columns 1-4 show strong positive correlations between input prices and firm size, export status, and importer status. Column 5 shows that the import dummy becomes smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant once we include the variable together with exporter status and the import price index. The latter is highly significant and positive, and this relationship is robust to including further controls (column 6). Together, these results indicate a complementarity between the quality of imported inputs and those that are purchased domestically. This relationship dominates the direct correlation between importer status and domestic input prices, indicating that import quality is crucial.
Imported Inputs and Skilled Labor Share
We now analyze the relationship between importing inputs and the share of skilled workers employed at the firm level. We define h itj as the share of skilled workers in firm i in year t and run the main regression:
where imported quality is measured either by our price-based quality index θ imp it or by import skill intensity σ it . X it is a vector of control variables, and d imp it is a dummy for whether firm i is importing any inputs in year t. Finally, α jt denotes sector-year fixed effects (at the 3-digit level), and α r are regional dummies. We report the results for the import quality index θ imp it in Table  3 . The first three columns restrict the sample to firms that import at least some of their inputs. Across importing firms, there is a strong positive correlation between import prices and the share of skilled workers. This is in line with the complementarity effect in our model, which implies that c.p. (i.e., conditional on importing the same fraction of inputs), firms with higher-quality inputs will also demand a higher proportion of skilled labor. In additional, we find strong support for the substitution effect: the higher the import share of firms, the lower the proportion of skilled workers that they employ. This suggests that imported inputs tend to fill in for tasks that would otherwise be performed by relatively skilled workers. These results are robust to controlling for capital worker and productivity (proxied by log value added per worker). Both of these controls are strongly positively associated with the share of skilled workers. We also control for the share of intermediate inputs overall in production because part of higher import shares might merely be due to firms using more intermediates. This control variable is insignificant and switches signs when including fixed effects in columns 2 and 3.
[Insert Table 3 shows that these firms use on average a significantly lower proportion of skilled workers. In addition, conditional on being an importer, the skill share falls further with the import share. Both observations are in line with the substitution effect in our model. We also continue to find strong support for the complementarity effect -the coefficient on import prices θ imp it is highly significant and positive. Finally, the coefficients and significance of control variables are largely unchanged. Table 4 repeats the previous regressions, using import skill intensity σ it as a proxy for the quality of imported inputs. This alternative measure does not need to rely on the assumption that prices reflect quality. Instead, it assumes that products which require a larger proportion of white-collar workers (using U.S. production techniques as reference point) are more complex or of higher quality. We obtain qualitatively very similar results as with θ imp it : Firms that import more skill intensive imports use a higher share of skilled workers in production. This supports the complementarity effect.
[Insert Table 4 here]
In Table 5 we include interaction terms of our import quality proxies θ imp it and σ it with the ratio of imports to sales. For both variables we find positive and significant interaction terms. In columns 1 and 4, we only include the respective import quality measure, the import share, and the interaction term. Columns 2 and 4 add control variables, and columns 3 and 6 extend the analysis to the full sample of firms, controlling for importer status with the dummy variable d Imp it . These results suggest that the complementarity effect is the stronger the larger the share of imported inputs. Specifically, the implied combined coefficient on the input quality measures roughly triples when going from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the import share.
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[Insert Table 5 here]
Variation within Firms
[tbd]
Predicting input shares with tariff data
We use changes in import tariffs at the detailed HS-6 level to predict changes in σ it . The required exclusion restriction is that tariff rates are exogenous to the firm-specific use of skilled labor. With- 21 The 10th and the 90th percentile of the import share are, respectively, .0056 and .420. The combined coefficient is obtained by multiplying these with the interaction term and adding the coefficient on θ imp it (for columns 1-3) or σ it (columns 4-6).
out controlling for variation at the detailed sector level, the exclusion restriction may be violated. In particular, fast-growing sectors may become more skill-intensive and simultaneously push for tariff reductions. Similarly, tariff reductions can emerge from industrial policy that targets specific sectors However, lobbying requires coordination across firms with common interests (thus likely producing similar products), and industrial policy targets sectors rather than individual firms. Thus, we are confident that controlling for variation across 4-digit ISIC sectors accounts for these concerns.
Construction of predicted σ it
Tariff rates at the HS-6 level are derived from the underlying HS-8 data. Note that at the HS-8 level, tariffs are specific to the 8-digit product type j, the country of origin c, as well as year t. Aggregation of imports to the 6-digit level introduces the additional dimension of variation across firms i. This can be seen from the following:
where imp
ijtc are imports at the HS-6 level. In words, our aggregation uses weights of 8-digit import shares within the 6-digit categories. Since 8-digit imports and thus the weights vary across firms, the aggregation to HS-6 introduces variation across firms. Consequently, tariff HS6 ijtc is the weighted average tariff rate paid by firm i in year t for imports of goods in the 6-digit category j from country c. Correspondingly, we calculate firm i's import share from each HS-6 category j in year t from country c:
From here, our identification follows two steps: First, we predict the share of imported intermediates used in each firm with the corresponding import tariff rates. We estimate the equation
where α sy are year-specific 3-digit sector dummies (at the CIIU level) that capture industry-specific variation of import shares over time and X it represents control variables at the firm level that are included at this stage because they are also used in the second stage regressions below. With the dependent variable in logarithm, and tariff
HS6
ijcy distributed over the unit interval, the coefficient β can be interpreted as the elasticity of imports with respect to tariffs. In the baseline regression, the coefficient β is the same for all import categories. Table 9 shows those results, where β is highly significant and negative.
[Insert Table 9 here] From this regression, we predict s ijtc . Aggregating over the countries of origin yields the predicted input shares s ijt = ∑ c s ijtc . This variable is not necessarily between 0 and 1. We thus normalize it, dividing by the predicted total imported intermediates of firm i in year t within the corresponding HS-6 category:
Finally, we use this variable to derive the predicted input skill intensity in line with (25):
The set of control variables and fixed effects included in the second stage regressions varies across specifications. We thus run (31) using the respective controls of each specification and calculate the corresponding s ijt . Finally, Table 10 reports the results when we use the predicted σ it in a regression with the share of skilled workers as dependent variable. Because σ it can be predicted only for importing firms, the dataset is now restricted to this subset. We find a strong positive association between predicted import skill bias and the share of skilled workers at the firm level, which confirms our previous results in support of a complementarity effect.
[Insert Table 10 here]
Alternative Interpretations
Falling import tariffs do not only affect firm's usage of intermediates. They also increase competition from foreign suppliers of the same good or close substitutes. In relation to our argument, this gives rise to the following concern: Import tariffs, and in particular changes in tariffs, may vary systematically with the skill intensity of imports. For example, if industrial policy seeks to protect infant high-tech industries, high tariffs on skill-intensive high-tech products will result. Trade liberalization would then lead to larger tariff reductions for skill-intensive imports. This, in turn, may lead to skill upgrading because of increased international competition. As Bustos (2011) shows in the context of exports, internationally competitive firms tend to be more skill intensive. Figure 10 shows that Chilean import tariffs were increasing in the skill intensity of the corresponding products in 1992, while no such relation is present in 2005. However, the positive relationship is insignificant once sector 30 (pharmaceutical products) is dropped. Figure 11 shows that there is no systematic relationship between tariff changes and skill intensity of production. Thus, our results are unlikely to be driven by a trade-policy related correlation between tariff changes and sector level skill demand.
Conclusion
We examine the effect of access to imported inputs on firm performance in developing countries. Our approach allows for inputs of heterogeneous quality levels, combined with an O-Ring-type quality complementarity. Assuming that high-quality inputs are relatively cheaper in rich countries, the model predicts that firms in developing countries replace quality-sensitive domestic inputs by imported ones. This substitution (or Heckscher-Ohlin) effect lowers the demand for input quality (e.g., skills) in importing firms. However, there is also a complementarity effect that operates in the opposite direction: importing high-quality inputs raises a firm's demand for quality in the inputs that are still purchased domestically. This can raise the demand for skills.
We find strong evidence in line with these predictions, using a large panel of manufacturing firms in Chile, paired with detailed import data from Chilean customs. Within narrowly defined industries, importing firms are ceteris paribus less skill intensive. This indicates specialization in low-skilled tasks, while importing inputs that substitute high-skilled tasks. However, the share of skilled workers rises significantly in the quality of imported inputs, which supports the complementarity effect. In addition, the data show that importing firms pay higher wages to both blue-collar and white-collar workers -this also follows from the model if the complementarity effect is relatively strong.
These results suggest that the role of imported skill-biased technology has to be interpreted with caution. Existing models typically incorporate a direct complementarity between all imported inputs (capital equipment) and skills in a CES production function (c.f. . While this complementarity effect exists, the substitution effect diminishes skill demand, and our empirical results suggest that the latter more than compensates the former. Only for high-quality inputs is the complementarity strong enough to raise skill demand of importing firms. This adds a quality-dimension to (Csillag and Koren, 2011) , who find that imported machines in general raise the wage of workers operating them. In a broader context, our results imply that O-Ring type quality complementarities operate across firms and borders -embedded in intermediate and capital inputs. (24) for product k in year t. This measure equals zero if imported and domestically purchased inputs of category k have the same price, on average; it is greater than zero of imports of the same good are more expensive. The Kernel density is based on 2,489 observations of θ kt between 1996 and 2000. The median and mean are 1.24 and 1.54, respectively. Notes: Clustered standard errors (at firm level) in parentheses. Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. Notes: Clustered standard errors (at the firm level) in parentheses. Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. The share of skilled workers is defined as +++. The Import price index θ
TABLES
Imp it
is derived as in equation (22). Sectors reflect 89 4-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors; sector-year FE include separate fixed effects for each sector in each year. Notes: Clustered standard errors (at the firm level) in parentheses. Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. The share of skilled workers is defined as +++. Import skill intensity σ
is derived as in equation (25). Sectors reflect 89 4-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors; sector-year FE include separate fixed effects for each sector in each year. 29,193 29,193 63,987 29,193 29,193 63,987 
HS6
ijcy vary across firms (i), HS-6 import categories (j), country of import origin (c), and year (y). Specifications (1)-(3) use the same β for all sectors; in (4)-(6), the coefficients vary at the HS-2 level and the reported coefficient in the first row is the average across 93 HS-2 categories. Specifications (1) and (4) use all import-firm observations, (2) and (5) use only observations where firms purchased imports from at least two different SIC-4 categories, and (3) and (6) expand this constraint to firm-level imports from at least five different SIC-4 categories. In this section, we solve the model for the optimal quality of output, Q * ω , as well as for the corresponding input quality q * iω . The choice of input quality depends on the cost function (5). When import tariffs are prohibitively high, the parameters a and b are the same for all inputs. However, when import tariffs fall, high-quality inputs can be purchased cheaper abroad. To allow for this possibility, we keep track of the input-variety specific costs a iω and b iω when solving the model.
We begin by deriving an expression for the quality-dependent unit cost function, C(Q ω ). Deriving (7) with respect to q iω yields
where c ′ (q iω ) is the marginal cost of raising the quality of input i, i.e., the slope of the quality-cost profile. The marginal cost of output quality M C ω follows from the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in (A.1) and is given by
This formulation expresses the marginal cost as a function of individual inputs. 1 In the following, we derive this expression as a function of output quality.
1 Note that since we have taken the cutoffι ω as given so far, the integral in (A.2) is calculated across all inputs i. Below, firms also decide the optimalι ω , so that the integral in (A.2) will be split into two parts as in (7). This also eliminates the discontinuity implicit in (A.2) at c ′ (q iω ) | i=ιω , i.e., at q iω =q (the input quality at which it becomes optimal to import). Equation (A.1) implies that the ratio of the first input's quality to the quality of the i's input is given by q iω q 1ω =
Thus, knowing the quality choice for one of the N inputs allows us to derive the quality of all other inputs, too. We substitute this expression in (3) to obtain: .4) , yields the quality-specific unit cost function given by (7). In addition, re-arranging (A.3) and substituting in (A.4) yields the optimal input quality for a given output quality Q ω :
So far, we have taken the cutoffι ω as given; it has been hidden in the integral over all inputs i. In the following, we use the fact that all inputs i ≤ι ω are purchased at home, while the remainder is purchased abroad. Thus, total quality-specific cost is given by C({q iω } ,ι ω ) = ∫ι
, where C f,ω (ι ω ) ≡ι ω a H + (1 −ι ω )a F + m ω . Using this expression together with (A.5), we obtain the quality-specific cost as a function of output quality: A.6) where the integral I(ι ω ) is defined as in (8) in the paper. Finally, we derive the optimal quality of inputs, given that the output quality is optimized. We re-arrange (A.4) to obtain q 1ω as a function of Q ω and substitute Q * ω from (12). This yields the optimal quality of the first input
Substituting this expression back into (A.3) gives (13).
Appendix p.2
A.2 Optimal output quality and choice of the cutoffι ω As shown in Section 2.3 in the paper, firms' profit maximization amounts to minimizing the average cost of output quality C(Q ω ,ι ω )/Q ω , where the cost of output quality is given by , Minimizing C(Q ω ,ι ω )/Q ω with respect Q ω andι ω yields the following first order conditions:
The first condition simplifies to equation (12), while the second provides an implicit solution for ι ω . Since I ′ (ι ω ) > 0, the left-hand-side (LHS) is increasing inι ω , and I(0) = 0. The right-hand side (RHS) is positive constant for a given Q ω . Thus, the problem has a unique solutionι ω (Q ω ), for any given output quality Q ω . The relevant solution for our purpose isι * ω , which is associated with the optimal output quality Q * ω . We derive this by combining the two first-order conditions (FOC). First, we calculate the value of the integral: .9) Substituting this in the second FOC above implies:
The LHS in this equation is increasing and LHS(ι ω = 0) = 0. The RHS is starts off at −∞ for ι ω = 0 and then converges to We can now use (A.10) to prove Proposition 3:
PROOF of Proposition 3. Equation (A.10), which implicitly determinesι * ω , is a function of the parameters that govern the shape of c H (q) and c F (q) (a H , b H , a F , b F ) , as well as of the firm's draw of m ω .
A.3 Constant profits across firms
In this section, we determine A ω such that Π ω =Π, ∀ω. Following (10), this implies that AC(Q ω ) must be constant. To use this fact, we first simplify C(Q ω ). Substituting (12) in (7), we obtain the unit cost of output at the optimal quality level:
Using (12), this yields average quality-specific costs:
≡ÂC ω (A.12) whereÂC ω is constant for a given variety ω but varies across varieties. We still have to determinê AC ω such that profits are equalized across firms. At the same time, we want the equilibrium quality to vary across firms. The latter is the case if m ω varies by firms. Let us assume that m ω ≥ 0, and use the first variety as 'numeraire' such that m 0 = 0 and A 0 = 1. Thus, (A.12) implies:
2(1−ρ) (A.13) AC 0 is the average cost of variety ω = 0, given that the profit-maximizing quality of this variety is produced. For all varieties ω > 0, we will have m ω > 0. In order for these to make the same profit as the 'numeraire variety' producer, their average quality-related cost must satisfy:ÂC ω =ÂC 0 . For any given m ω > 0 this imposes a restriction on A ω :
Finally, we can substitute (A.14) in (12) to obtain the optimal choice of quality under the regime where profits are constant across firms:
Thus,Q * ω increases in m ω .
